Abstract. Let n = pq be an RSA modulus with unknown prime factors of equal bit-size. Let e be the public exponent and d be the secret exponent satisfying ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)) where φ(n) is the Euler totient function. To reduce the decryption time or the signature generation time, one might be tempted to use a small private exponent d. Unfortunately, in 1990, Wiener showed that private exponents smaller than 1 3 n 1/4 are insecure and in 1999, Boneh and Durfee improved the bound to n 0.292 . In this paper we show that instances of RSA with even large private exponents can be efficiently broken if there exist positive integers X, Y such that |eY − XF (u)| and Y are suitably small where F is a function of publicly known expression for which there exists an integer u = 0 satisfying F (u) ≈ n and pu or qu is computable from F (u) and n. We show that the number of such exponents is at least O n 3/4−ε when F (u) = p(q − u).
Introduction
Let n = pq be an RSA modulus, i.e the product of two large primes p, q of roughly the same size. Let e and d be the public and secret exponents satisfying ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)) where φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1) is the Euler totient function related to n. The public key and the private key consist of the tuples (n, e) and (p, q, d) respectively.
Since its publication in 1978, the RSA cryptosystem [8] has been analyzed for vulnerability by many researchers (see [2] ). Since RSA is computationally expensive, one might be tempted to use short secret exponents d in order to speed up the decryption process. Unfortunately, in 1990, Wiener [11] showed that RSA is insecure if d ≤ Wiener's attack uses continued fractions, the Boneh and Durfee attack is based on Coppersmith's method for finding small roots of modular polynomial equations [4] . In 2002, de Weger [10] improved these bounds for the RSA modulus n = pq with small prime difference |p − q|. Recently, Blömer and May [1] extended both Wiener and de Weger attacks for the RSA cryptosystems with secret exponents having the modular factorization d ≡ −xy −1 (mod φ(n)) where x and y are suitably small. Moreover, they showed that the number of such weak exponents is at least O n 3/4−ε where ε is a positive constant. All the known non-factoring attacks on RSA exploit the weakness of the public exponent e relative to φ(n) focusing on the information encoded in e and φ(n). The starting point is the equation ed − kφ(n) = 1, or, as considered in [1] , the more general equation
where x, y, k are suitably small relatively prime integers.
In this paper, we present an attack on RSA by exploiting additional information that may be encoded in the public exponent e relatively to special functions of the primes p and q. Let F be a function satisfying the conditions There exists an integer u = 0 such that F (u) ≈ n.
(
There exists a transformation relating F (u) to a multiple of p or q.
We now introduce the concept of F -constrained public exponents. Let us formalize this notion.
Definition 1.1. Let n be an RSA modulus and F a function satisfying the conditions (1), (2) . A public exponent e is F -constrained if there exist an integer u and two coprime positive integers X and Y such that both Y and |eY − F (u)X| are suitably small.
The integers X, Y will be formally defined in Theorem 3.1. We list below typical examples of functions satisfying the conditions (1), (2) . Let u 0 = 0 be a fixed rational and F a function defined by one of the following expressions
Observe that when u 0 = 1, we have F 3 (1) = (p − 1)(q − 1) = φ(n). This indicates that our method is a natural extension of the attack of Blömer and May [1] which in turn is an extension of Wiener's attack [11] . In this paper, we mainly study the cryptanalysis of RSA with F 1 -constrained exponents. More precisely, we show that if e satisfies the equation
with unknown integers u, X, Y , Z such that
then n can be factored in polynomial time. In a new way, we will show that the number of F 1 -constrained exponents is at least O n 3/4−ε . Our new method works as follows. Assume that e is F (u)-constrained for some integer u where F is a function satisfying (1), (2) . We use the continued fraction algorithm to find X and Y in (3) by replacing (2) , an approximationP of a multiple of p or q. We then apply May's extension (Theorem 10 of [7] ) of Coppersmith's method [4] to find the factorization of n.
The RSA cryptosystem and digital signature schemes are based on the generation of random primes p, q of roughly equal size and generation of random exponents e, d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(pq)). Indeed, RSA with private exponent d < n 0.292 , can be efficiently broken with Wiener's continued fraction attack [11] or Boneh and Durfee's lattice-based attack [3] . In this paper we show that there are some security risks if the public exponent is chosen poorly even if the companion private exponent is large. We recommend to avoid public exponents e satisfying eY − F (u)X = Z with suitably small values X, Y , Z where F is a function of publicly known expression satisfying the conditions (1), (2) . Notice that it is easy for a crypto-designer to see that the public exponent e is constrained by checking if eY − F (u)X = Z is solvable in suitably small X, Y , Z for any function F in a fixed public list. On the other hand, our study shows that such exponents are numerous (at least O n 3/4−ε with F = F 1 ). The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review former continued fraction attacks on RSA with short secret exponents. In Section 3, we discuss the possibility of determining the first convergents of the continued fraction expansion of e F (u) using e n if e is F (u)-constrained. In Section 4 we show how to factor the RSA modulus n when e is F 1 -constrained and give an estimation of the number of such exponents. We will use techniques from the continued fraction expansion combined with Coppersmith's Theorem [4] and May's extension [7] . In Section 5, we give a numerical example to illustrate our attack. Exploiting the symmetry on the primes p and q in F 1 and F 1 , the vulnerability of an RSA cryptosystem with an F 1 -constrained public exponent e follows.
A key role in our attack is played by the following extension of the well-known theorem of Coppersmith [4] . Then n can be factorized in time polynomial in log n.
2 Former continued fraction attacks on RSA with weak exponents
In this section, we present three former attacks on RSA based on the continued fractions. All the attacks exploit the weakness of the public exponent e relative to φ(n).
The Wiener attack.
The public and private exponents are related by the equation
Wiener exploits the fact that e φ(n) ≈ e n and n = pq for primes p, q of the same bit-size. Combining the arithmetical properties of φ(n) with the assumption d <
By Legendre's theorem (see [6] ), k d is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of e n .
The de Weger attack.
The continued fraction part of the de Weger attack [10] applies to an RSA modulus with small difference between its primes. It exploits the approximation φ(n) ≈ n+1−2 √ n and the weakness of e relative to φ(n) and works as follows. Using ed − kφ(n) = 1 and assuming that φ(n) > 3 4 n, n > 8d with d < n 3 4 p − q ,
Hence k d is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of e n+1−2 √ n .
The Blömer-May attack.
The attack of Blömer and May [1] combines the continued fraction expansion of e n and Coppersmith's lattice-based technique for finding small roots of univariate modular polynomial equations [4] . The attack applies when the public exponent e is weak relative to φ(n) and is based on the existence of coprime integers x, y, k satisfying ex
and |y| ≤ cn
where c ≤ 1. Combining with the properties of φ(n), they showed that
Hence k x is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of e n . Next, they applied Coppersmith's method [4] to find the factorization of the modulus n as follows. Using
Since k and x are known, then s = n + 1 − ex k is an approximation of p + q up to an error term The extension of the continued fraction attacks by Verheul and van Tilborg [9] and its modification by Dujella [5] applies to d ≤ n 1 4 + γ 2 provided exhaustive search on O(γ log 2 (n)) bits. These extensions are also based on the weakness of e relative to φ(n).
3 The continued fraction expansion of e F (u)
Let F be a function satisfying (1), (2) . Our goal in this section is to guess a part of the continued fraction expansion of e F (u) . Recall that F (u) is close to n for some unknown u. Moreover, we suppose that 0 < F (u) < 2n so that there exists α with −
Theorem 3.1. Let F be a function satisfying (1) , (2) and n = pq an RSA modulus with
and
By assumption, we have
By Legendre's theorem (see [6] ), X Y is a convergent of the continued fraction expansion of e n . Theorem 3.1 relates the unknowns Y , Z in the equation (3) . Let us find a lower bound for the quantity X.
Corollary 3.2. With the hypothesis of Theorem 3.1, we have
Proof. Since by assumption −
, which terminates the proof.
4. Vulnerability of RSA using F = F 1
In this section, we will show that using an RSA modulus n = pq with q < p and an F 1 -constrained public exponent e is insecure. Recall that F 1 (u) = p(q − u). We will also give an estimation of the number of F 1 (u)-constrained exponents for a fixed u and derive an estimation of the number of F 1 -constrained exponents.
4.1 Cryptanalysis of RSA with F 1 -constrained exponents.
Theorem 3.1 relates the unknowns Y , Z of the equation (3) and shows that the first convergents of e F 1 (u) are among the convergents of e n . In the following theorem, we give a condition relating X and Y and leading to the factorization of n. 
HenceP is an approximation of pu with an error term less than 2n Let us consider the α term as defined in (4). Since q < √ n < p and
with 0 < α < 1 2 . We now state our result concerning the vulnerability of RSA using F = F 1 . 
and |Z| ≤ 2n This shows that (6) is also satisfied. Hence, by Theorem 3.1, X Y is a convergent of e n . On the other hand, combining (7) with F = F 1 and (9), we get
Hence, by Theorem 4.1, n can be factored in polynomial time.
The number of F 1 (u)-constrained exponents.
Let u be a fixed integer satisfying 1 ≤ |u| ≤ q − 1. We indicate below how the crypto designer could build public exponents which are F 1 (u)-constrained using only very short values of X, Y . We begin by the following useful lemma. We use the usual notation x for the integral part of x. . Let X, Y be coprime integers with
Proof. Let Z = eY − F 1 (u)X. By the definition of e, we have
Combining with the inequalities 1 ≤ X < Y < 
To show that e > n Hence (10) is equivalent with
with 1 ≤ |u| ≤ q − 1. An arithmetical study of the derivatives of f shows that for any such u we have
This confirms (10) and completes the proof. . Let X, Y be coprime integers with
Y is a convergent of both e F 1 (u) and e n and e is F 1 (u)-constrained.
On the other hand, by the definition of e, we have
Hence 
This shows that
and the inequality (6) of Theorem 3.1 is satisfied where F = F 1 . Moreover, by (11), we have
and (5) 
Thus, by Theorem 4.1, e is F 1 (u)-constrained which terminates the proof. 
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that
By definition, e satisfies (11). Similarly, we have
Combining (11) and (12), we get
From this, we derive
By assumption e = e . Then 0
Hence XY − X Y = 0 and since gcd(X, Y ) = gcd(X , Y ) = 1, we get X = X and
For a fixed integer u satisfying 1 ≤ |u| ≤ q − 1, we state below a lower bound for the number of F 1 (u)-constrained public exponents. . If gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1, then e is not a valid public exponent. Let e = e + h for some integer h with gcd(e + h, φ(n)) = 1 and 
where K is a constant related to the Euler constant, the number of the F 1 (u)-constrained exponents is at least
Replacing 2ε + ε by ε, this terminates the proof.
4.3
The number of F 1 -constrained exponents. Theorem 4.6 gives an estimation of the number of F 1 (u)-constrained exponents for a fixed u. It remains to give an estimation of the number of F 1 -constrained exponents. Let u and u be a fixed integers with 1 ≤ |u|, |u | ≤ q − 1. We show below that if e is simultaneously constrained to F 1 (u) and F 1 (u ), then u = u . Proof. Assume that
From this, we get
Using F 1 (u) = n − pu, F 1 (u ) = n − pu , this gives
From this, it follows that
Combining X and X , we get We now give an estimation for the number of F 1 -constrained public exponents. , which terminates the proof.
A numerical example using F = F 1
Let n = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p. Let e be a public exponent. In this section, we give an algorithm to factor the modulus n if e is F 1 (u)-constrained for some unknown u where
The algorithm.
INPUT: a) The RSA modulus n = pq with unknown prime factors.
b) The public exponent e such that eY − F (u)X = Z for some unknown integers u, X, Y and Z satisfying (8) and (9). p−q , which explains why the continued fraction attack of de Weger [10] also fails.
Conclusion
Using methods based on continued fractions and May's extension of Coppersmith's Theorem, we showed that an RSA cryptosystem with modulus n = pq and a public exponent e is insecure if there exist an integer u such that n − pu ≈ n and a convergent We analysed the security of RSA using the function F 1 where F 1 (u) = p(q − u). The situation is similar with the symmetric function F 1 where F 1 (u) = q(p−u). As mentioned in the introduction, RSA could be insecure if the public exponent e is constrained with other sort of functions satisfying similar conditions. Our results show that one should be very cautious when using an RSA modulus with a constrained exponent.
